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PROFESSOR KENDE: On behalf of Thomas M. Cooley Law
School, I want to welcome you to the Krinock Lecture. My name is
Mark Kende and I am an Associate Professor of Law here at Thomas
M. Cooley. The Krinock Lecture is in honor of the distinguished
service rendered by a former Dean of the law school, the late Robert
Krinock. The Krinock Lecture is unique because it has been funded
entirely by personal contributions form the faculty. Its purpose is to
enrich the intellectual environment of the law school and the
community by bringing in prominent speakers on law-related topics.
This term, we are doing something a little bit different though with
the lecture. Instead of just having one person giving a speech, we are
having a debate. The topic of the debate will be: "Is American Law
Inherently Racist?" We are honored to have two nationally renowned
legal scholars join us this evening to conduct the debate. They are
Professor Richard Delgado of the University of Colorado Law School,
who will be arguing the affirmative side of the topic, and Professor
Daniel Farber of the University of Minnesota Law School, who will
be arguing the negative side, and I will be moderating the debate.
Before I more fully introduce each of our speakers and describe their
impressive credentials, I want to explain the format of the debate so
everyone undeistands how we are going to do things. Initially
Professor Delgado will make a two-minute opening statement
followed by Professor Farber who will make his two-minute opening
statement. Professor Delgado will then have twenty minutes to
present his case in chief and after he has concluded, he will have five
minutes to answer audience questions that are solely about his
particular argument. Professor Farber will then have twenty-five
minutes to present his responsive case in chief. He too will then
answer audience questions for five minutes related solely to his
* Jean N. Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., U.C.
Berkeley School of Law, 1974.
** Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota. J.D., summa cur laude, University of Illinois School of Law,
1975.
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remarks. Professor Delgado will then have ten minutes of rebuttal
time to reply to Professor Farber. Professor Farber will follow with
ten minutes of time, and then Professor Delgado will conclude with
a five-minute statement. After the debate part of the event has
concluded, Professor Delgado and Farber will answer questions for up
to twenty minutes. This is basically the format of this debate.
Now let me introduce our distinguished debaters more thorough-
ly. Richard Delgado is the Jean N. Lindsley Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado Law School, where he has taught classes in
civil procedure, civil rights, and biotechnology and the law since
1990. He has also taught at Arizona State, Washington, UCLA,
University of California at Davis, and Wisconsin. Professor Delgado
graduated from the University of California at Berkeley Law School
in 1974, where he served as the Notes and Comments Editor of the
University of California Law Review. Professor Delgado is a prolific
scholar having authored numerous books and more than one hundred
law review articles. His books have won six national book awards
including the American Library Association's Outstanding Academic
Book (for his book "The Coming Race War"), four Gustavus Myers
prizes for the Outstanding Book on human rights, and a Pulitzer Prize
nomination. His award winning book "The Rodrigo Chronicles" is a
dialogue between a law student and a professor.
Professor Delgado is most well known for being one of the
leading commentators and authors in the field of race and law in
America. He is considered one of the founders of the critical race
theory movement, which argues that American law is based on racist
assumptions and tendencies. He has appeared as a commentator about
race on programs such as Good Morning America, the McNeil-Lehrer
Report, PBS, and NPR. We are honored to have Professor Delgado
arguing the affirmative side of the topic.
Daniel A. Farber is the Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and
Associate Dean for Faculty at the University of Minnesota Law
School where he has taught constitutional law, environmental law,
civil procedure, and legislation since 1987. He was a visiting
professor at the Harvard Law School during the spring of 1998 and
has also taught at Stanford and the University of Illinois. Professor
Farber graduated summa cum laude and first in his class from the
University of Illinois in 1975, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the
University of Illinois Law Review. He served as a law clerk to
United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens.
Professor Farber has also authored numerous books and law
review articles on constitutional law and environmental law topics.
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He has authored a casebook on constitutional law and environmental
law and has just had a treatise entitled "The First Amendment"
published by Foundation Press. He is currently the Editor of the
journal "Constitutional Commentary." Along with his colleague,
Professor Phil Frickey, he has authored a leading book on public
choice theory. Professor Farber's book "Beyond All Reason: The
Radical Assault on Truth and American Law," co-authored with
Professor Suzanna Sherry,. is perhaps the most comprehensive critique
yet of the critical race theorists. Professor Farber will be arguing the
negative side of the debate.
On a personal note, I want to thank both speakers for being
willing to come here to Cooley today, for braving this debate format,
and for being so easy to work with. So if we could, I would like to
give them a round of applause before we begin. Without further
adieu, let me now turn the podium over to Professor Delgado for his
two-minute introduction and to begin the debate.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR DELGADO: Thank you Mark. As the first speaker,
and I hope before the clock starts to run, I would like to thank
Professor Kende and the faculty of Thomas M. Cooley Law School
for sponsoring this debate, and of course for inviting me. It seems to
me that in just the last few months and years, this country has
returned to an examination of race in a way that did not characterize
the ten or fifteen years just before that. All to our good, I think. I
am thinking of books like William Bowen and Derek Bok's recently
issued book,' evaluating twenty years of affirmative action. I am
thinking, as well, of John Hope Franklin's Presidential Commission
and its workshops and community events around the nation. You
could see today's event as part of a series that reexamines this
nation's oldest and perhaps most intractable problem-race. I would
like to commend Thomas M. Cooley Law School for scheduling it.
Probably most of you know me through my writing on race and
racism. You know, that way of disseminating one's ideas is a whole
lot easier. You just stay at your desk and spin the ideas out and
someone else takes it from there and publishes them. I am very
happy, however, to be able to take part in a public event like this
I. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (Princeton
Univ. Press 1998).
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even though it entails removing myself 2,000 miles from my home
base and living out of a suitcase for three days because I think the
whole thing is terribly important.
It struck me this morning that my friend Dan Farber over there
has much the easier task of the two of us-purely in debate terms.
For I am the one who has to prove a superlative-namely, that
American law is inherently racist. Not just sometimes, occasionally,
or often racist, but inherently so. I am reminded of those automobile
executives who argued that a model of car was not inherently unsafe
merely because it burst into flames upon light rear-end contact, since
the rest of the time it provided safe transportation for American
families at a price that they could afford. Or that character in the
Russian novel2 who did his landlady in, and then defended himself
by pointing out all the good deeds he expected to do later in life.
To make today's question more manageable, not to mention
easier for me, I will define a system as inherently racist if it is recur-
rently so-that is, it keeps coming back to the behavior time and
again and for each of the different minority groups. And second, it
does so for reasons seemingly imbedded in its very structure and
makeup, its social DNA, so to speak. Particularly if you are White,
I hope you will listen with an open mind to the evidence that I will
present today during my case-in-chief. Some of what you hear may
be unfamiliar-not in standard history or constitutional law textbooks.
It may go against your sense that things are better today for persons
of color, as indeed they are for some.
White folks tend to see, literally, fewer acts of out and out racism
than their brothers and sisters of color do. A merchant who is in the
practice of hassling well-behaved black teenagers in his or her store,
will generally not do so if white shoppers are there watching. A
police officer who routinely stops motorists of color driving through
certain neighborhoods may refrain from doing so if a well-dressed
Caucasian is in the back seat of the car. Talk of racism also makes
people feel defensive and want to change the subject-perhaps to that
other group's responsibility for their low estate.
Yet as recent events show, denial is rarely a successful, much less
helpful strategy. Coming to terms with the continuing legacy of race
and racism, fairly and openly, is the path to a stronger society and a
legal system that we can all be proud of. Thank you.
2. See FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Bantam ed. 1958).
(Vol. 15:361
AMERICAN LAW
PROFESSOR FARBER: When Suzanna Sherry and I wrote a book3
about critical race theory, radical feminism, and some related move-
ments, our greatest hope was to spark a dialogue. So I am especially
pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to discuss this issue
with Professor Delgado. Too often people on different sides of these
issues simply send manifestos out that repeat their own point of view
and do not really try to engage the other side. So I think this is a
tremendously constructive occasion, at least I hope it will be.
I was very struck in his introductory remarks by Professor Delga-
do's statement that, in a sense, racism is part of the DNA of the
American legal system, a sort of genetic flaw. I think that really is
a fair statement of the heart of critical race theory. Although I under-
stand the frustration that leads people to that conclusion, I continue
to think that it is wrong. It underestimates our capacity to change the
legal system, and it ignores important parts of our legal history. In
the end, despite the good intentions of people who favor that view,
this thesis of inherent racism will only interfere with public dialogue
about racial issues and make it more difficult for us to confront our
important racial problems today.
PROFESSOR DELGADO'S CASE-IN-CHIEF
PROFESSOR DELGADO: The man whose name graces this law
school, Thomas M. Cooley, treatise writer and Chief Justice of the
Michigan Supreme Court, also served for a time as founding dean of
the University of Michigan Law School. An extraordinary figure,
especially for his time, he opposed credentialism and class bias, and
favored open access for legal education. He never denied admission
to a Black, at a time when virtually all of the nation's law schools
did, some continuing to do so as recently as the 1970s. And he
graduated black lawyers more than 130 years ago, when the number
of Blacks practicing law in the United States was fewer than twenty.
A Burkean conservative, he nevertheless was a follower of Abraham
Lincoln, who worked ceaselessly on behalf of farmers and the poor.
He was listed by Roscoe Pound as one of the top ten judges of all
time and not one to sweep important moral problems under the rug.
It is worth speculating, it seems to me, on how he would have come
out in the debates raging today on issues like affirmative action and
3. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON THE TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
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militarization of the United States border with Mexico. My guess is
that he would be standing foursquare behind Blacks, immigrants, and
the poor in their struggle for justice, equality, and respect.
The story one usually hears today about race and racial justice is
what I call the triumphalist one. According to it, slavery was a terri-
ble thing. But it ended with Lincoln's proclamation and the enact-
ment of civil rights statutes this century and last. If African-Ameri-
cans have not yet reached full equality, at least the law recognizes
formal equality so that it is only a matter of time before they do.
Some minority groups, according to the story, have risen. Others will
follow when they adopt Anglo-American values of thrift, hard work,
and family stability. Slavery may even have done African-Americans
a favor, according to one recent writer, Dinesh D'Souza,4 by bringing
them here to this great land. Today black, brown, and Asian
entertainers and sports figures are millionaires and well-accepted by
majoritarian society, which pays money to see them perform. The
black middle class is growing, it is said, so the need for affirmative
action is fading. If anything, we may have gone too far in the
opposite direction, disadvantaging white males of superior aptitude
and credentials.
But coexisting with that upbeat story is a darker, less optimistic
one. This story reminds us that slavery yielded an enormous
economic boost to the South, and that oppression and economic
exploitation did not end upon the North's victory in the Civil War.
A regime of sharecropping and ruthless "Jim Crow" laws instead kept
Blacks separate but in no way equal.
Forbidden from intermarrying with Whites, a prohibition that was
not eased, legally, until Loving v. Virginia5 was decided in 1967,
Blacks who marry Whites today face social barriers so strong that
only a handful-a few percent--do. During slavery, Blacks were
forbidden from even learning to read and write, and so were excluded
from exposure to literature, which was then replete with arguments
about freedom and the rights of man. After emancipation, few school
districts, and even fewer universities and colleges, would admit Blacks
to white schools. Even today, the legal profession contains less than
five percent black lawyers and one percent black judges.
Ambitious and upward-striving Blacks--especially ones with
4. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY (Free Press 1996).
5. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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political ambitions-were firmly discouraged. Ones who eyeballed
white women, like Emmett Till, were lynched to send a message to
others. African-Americans made some inroads in sports and the
military, but were permitted to go only so far, especially in the officer
ranks. During World War I, many Blacks made gains both in the
services and in civilian war industries, but in a telling but little known
incident, the United States Military persuaded the federal government
to send an official directive to the government of France. Many U.S.
soldiers were stationed in that country during that war, where the
French treated the African-American ones in egalitarian fashion. This
caused consternation among the others, which filtered up the chain of
command until the United States finally asked the French authorities
to instruct their people to stop relating to black soldiers on terms of
equality. The directive explained that it made American white
soldiers uncomfortable to see the French shaking hands and making
friends with Blacks or inviting them into their homes. The directive,
in effect, instructed the French on how to be racist. It implied that
this was expected of them and was the least they could do to advance
the war effort.
Although formally racist laws are now forbidden, African-
American disadvantage persists on dozens of fronts, including credit,
home purchasing, average income, infant mortality, longevity, and
educational attainment. Covert studies employing testers, one white
and one black, but otherwise identical, show consistent discrimination
when Blacks try to rent a house, buy a car, buy a house, or apply for
a job. Handicapped even when they try to sue for redress for dis-
crimination, Blacks and other minorities of color find the judicial
system stacked against them. Although laws on the books ostensibly
give them the right to recover for provable discrimination, judicially
created burdens of proof, intent requirements, resjudicata laws, and
defenses such as business necessity make recovery much harder than
for any other civil cause of action such as negligence, battery,
defamation, or breach of contract. Many minority persons realize this
and never bother to sue, reasoning, "What's the use?"
In the late 1960s, many colleges, universities, and businesses
began using affirmative action, which helped a few of color rise to
middle class status and provide financial security for their families.
Today, even those modest programs are under attack by conservative
think tanks and legal foundations abetted by a judiciary that seems
bound to restore things to the way they were when the Supreme
1998]
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Court, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,6 said that Blacks have no rights that
Whites were bound to respect. Search and seizure law, ratified
recently by the United States Supreme Court, holds that a black or
brown motorist or pedestrian may be stopped on suspicion in a white
neighborhood simply by virtue of being who they are.7
Other nonwhite minority groups have fared little better at the
hands of American justice. Asian-Americans came to this country,
not in chains like Blacks, but to build the nation's railroads and dig
its mines. When these projects ended, Asians became surplus
labor-their presence a source of irritation to local Whites. Because
of their thrift and industry, many had opened businesses, such as
laundries and farms that competed successfully with those of Anglo-
Americans. The United States then passed racist immigration laws
that virtually ended Asian immigration, laws that were upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case.' In that
case, Justice Harlan, who had dissented courageously in Plessy v.
Ferguson,9 the "separate but equal" case, joined in an opinion that
portrayed Asian-American people as clannish, inassimilable, and
inferior.' ° The inability to help their wives and women friends to
immigrate caused a serious imbalance in the Asian population, which
quickly dwindled to a pool of aging solitary men. By the time of
World War II, numbers had risen, especially of Japanese on the West
Coast. But Wartime Exclusion Order 9066," issued on flimsy and
fabricated evidence, signed by the President of the United States and
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, 2 removed West Coast
Japanese families to internment camps where they spent the war
behind barbed wire. Many lost farms and businesses.
After a long campaign, the United States Congress finally passed
a limited reparations bill,' 3 which came too late for many Japanese
6. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
7. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
8. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595-609; see also Gabriel J. Chin, The
Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1996).
1I. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942).
12. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383, 101 Stat. 903, reprinted in 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1989-1989d (West 1998) (declaring an official apology, urging the President
to pardon those convicted who had refused to accept the discriminatory treatment, and
appropriating funds for restitution of $20,000 to each individual of Japanese ancestry who
was confined, relocated, or deprived of liberty or property).
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who had already died of old age. In recent years, many Asian-
Americans, particularly of Japanese or Chinese descent, have
improved their situation and have earned advanced degrees, particular-
ly in science. But, by a perverse maneuver, mainstream society
deemed them a model minority, deserving of no more help. When
one looks behind the statistics supposedly indicating Asian success,
one finds that certain Asian groups, particularly Indochinese and
Filipinos, are living in abject poverty. Even with the two model
groups, Japanese and Chinese, high household income often masks
extended families with many adults living under one roof, all working
at jobs, such as pharmacist, dentist, teacher, or lab technician. Studies
also show that Asian-Americans, like Blacks and Mexicans, who
attain a high educational level, such as a Ph.D., do not reap the same
rewards as Whites who possess the same degree.
Speaking of Mexican-Americans, or Chicanos (my group), most
people know that our lands in the "Southwest, once part of Mexico,
were seized in a war of naked aggression. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, which ended that war, guaranteed persons of Mexican
descent living in California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and parts
of Colorado and Utah the right to retain their land, language, and cul-
ture, and to become United States citizens. As with Native-Ameri-
cans, however, these treaty rights turned out to be worth little more
than the paper that they were written on. American authorities set up
land registration offices and rules that the Mexicans just happened to
find impossible to meet. Conniving developers and lawyers cheated
many out of their ancestral lands that the thrifty and industrious
Mexicans had developed into farms for generations with irrigation,
land tenure systems, wells, and roads. During the "Jim Crow" period
when Blacks were being discriminated against in the South, signs in
Texas said, "No dogs or Mexicans allowed." Mexicans were called
"greasers," "spics," and "wetbacks"-uppity ones were lynched.
When their labor was necessary for farming or work in the kitchens
and restaurants of large cities, official programs, called bracero or
guest worker regimes, brought in Mexicans by the thousands, who
then were expected to conveniently disappear when the harvest was
in. During the depression years and later, American authorities would
order roundups, during which tens of thousands of Mexican-looking
people, some of whom turned out to be legal United States citizens
here for generations, were captured and summarily deported. Like the
Japanese, they too lost everything-although at least they did not have
to live behind barbed wire.
1998]
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When school desegregation finally came for African-Americans,
schools in Texas and the Southwest cynically declared that Mexicans
were white and used them to integrate schools so that a public school
with fifty percent Mexicans and fifty percent Blacks was certified as
integrated. In Colorado, which many consider a bastion of clean
living and racial fairness, conditions for migrant laborers in the sugar
beet industry were some of the worst anywhere. During the 1920's,
the state was ruled by the Klu Klux Klan, its governor a member, as
were a majority of legislators and countless mayors and chiefs of
police. During that time, it goes without saying that Colorado was
not exactly a welcoming state for Mexican-Americans, Jews, or
Blacks moving to the great, free West. But even after the Klan
period ended, a depression-era governor decided that too many
Mexicans-probably no more than five or seven percent at that
time-were living in the state. So he blockaded the southern border
of the state to prevent Mexican or Chicano people from entering.
Mexican-American people today still talk about that episode, although
it is the sort of thing that you tend not to find in the official history
books. Even today Colorado enjoys at best a guarded reputation in
the Latino community.
Throughout the United States, Latinos today suffer from some of
the worst poverty and school dropout rates of any minority group and
enjoy even less political influence than Blacks, who have at least their
share of big-city mayors and a vibrant and effective congressional
black caucus-this, even though the numbers of both groups are
nearly the same and Latinos will pass Blacks within about seven years
as the largest minority group in the United States. Today, this
country is the most economically divided nation in the developed
world, with the largest gap in income and wealth between the
wealthiest and poorest sectors. It also has infant mortality, access to
health care, and incarceration rates worse than those of some
totalitarian or emerging countries. Our jails are mostly black and
brown, and black men who commit capital offenses against white
victims are thirteen times more likely to be sentenced to death than
Whites who kill Blacks. Jurors routinely award smaller damages for
the death or loss of a limb for persons of color. Jurors who speak
Spanish are eliminated from jury duty, even though they may have
Ph.D.'s in English literature, out of the concern that they may not
listen to the stumbling Spanish of a court interpreter. English-only
laws, enacted by referendum in more than twenty states, are thinly-
veiled attacks on Spanish-speaking Americans and Asians. Only
recently did a court strike down one of these as a violation of the
[Vol. 15:361
AMERICAN LA W
First Amendment.' 4 Of course, hate speech, a means by which some
Whites assault and insult Mexicans, Blacks, gays, and women, is
highly protected. The First Amendment, you see, is a precious right.
Bilingual education is under siege so that children who speak
absolutely no English will not be able to learn in their native language
beyond a certain point. Dishonest ads depicting Mexican women
sneaking across the border to give birth to babies in parking lots, and
pseudo scholarship put out by conservative so-called think tanks whip
up anti-immigrant sentiment in support of measures, federal and state,
targeting immigrants, some of them legal residents who are entitled
to be here and hold down valuable, thankless jobs.
Large numbers of Mexican-American people in Texas live in
colonias, shantytowns of tarpaper and tin houses, with open sewage,
pollution from nearby factories, and no running water. No zoning
laws operate, so that a battery factory could go up next to somebody's
house. Texas law does not require the counties to supply basic
amenities, and the shady developers who subdivided and sold the lots
to working poor families with the promise that water would be
brought in as soon as possible skip town or conveniently forget their
promises.
Conditions in rural areas are not much better. Migrant Latinos
who pick grapes or move from region to region with the crops live
with little field sanitation, in cramped and uncomfortable shacks
provided by the growers, and are exposed to high levels of pesticides,
insecticides, and other dangerous chemicals. The environmental
justice movement has only belatedly begun to turn attention to these
hazards, as well as the sitting of obnoxious waste facilities, sewage
treatment plants, dumping of radioactive tailings on Indian reserva-
tions, and other such biohazards imposed on minority and poor
communities. Rigorous environmental laws protect the residents of
Beverly Hills and keep the nation's parks and playgrounds pristine for
the largely suburban membership of organizations like the Sierra
Club. But only recently have environmentalism and environmental
law focused on lead paint, rats, and toxic waste.
I do not mean to slight other groups that have felt the sting of
racism, but time is short and I have other ground to cover. Jews were
intensely demonized when they first immigrated here and were treated
as a non-white group. Until very recently, many universities and
professional schools imposed quotas to keep their numbers small, and
14. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.3d 984, 987 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc).
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elite law firms refuse to hire or advance them to partnership. Today,
many private social clubs, where much business is transacted, still
refuse to admit Jews. Like Mexican-Americans, Native-Americans
had their ancestral land unceremoniously seized, the courts rationaliz-
ing this practice under the fiction that it was not really owned until
the white man got here. Indians who resisted were killed or forcibly
marched thousands of miles away and resettled on barren lands.
Ironically, those lands, in some cases, turned out later to contain
mineral wealth. The Indians were simply relocated a second time.
Most present day Americans meet Indians mainly through sports
mascots such as the Braves, Chiefs, or Redskins.
The situation of Native-Americans, like that of the other three
minority groups I have mentioned today, seems actually to be getting
worse, with the percentages of children living below the poverty level,
of marriageable men in prison, and even numbers of college under-
graduates actually standing at lower levels today than they did twenty
years ago. Theories of biological inferiority and genetic inability are
once again rampant and respectfully listened to, while even liberals
like Daniel Moynihan and James Q. Wilson talk of a culture of
poverty and broken window theories, under which any expression of
minority cultural self-assertion such as loud radios or enjoyment of
life needs to be stamped out.
Although my case-in-chief ends for each group with the present,
I have been at pains to sketch histories, since the past is what gives
present day racism its social meaning; since we sometimes need to
remind ourselves how much we have to live down; and to illustrate
why the past still lives, at least on an emotional and cultural level, in
the groups who have been subject to such mistreatment. As the
country becomes more diverse and the potential for racial conflict
heightens, it becomes even more imperative to understand ourselves
and our histories. As someone put it, those who refuse to understand
the lessons of the past are destined to relive them.
I will be back in my next time slot to address the one remaining
issue: Inherency.
AUDIENCE COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS
AUDIENCE: Is the great divider in our society color or is it more
based on economics in your view?
PROFESSOR DELGADO: I think both are terribly divisive factors.
We need to work on both at the same time. I think that it is an
[Vol. 15:361
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evasion to think that one can deal with the problems of poverty by
simply working for racial justice as much as it is an evasion to think
that one will work for and accomplish racial justice by dealing with
the problems of the poor. These are twin problems in an afflicted
society. They both seem inherent, or at any rate intractable, but they
require different strategies since black and brown poverty is different
from white poverty in several respects. It tends to last longer; it tends
to last forever. White families who are poor tend to remain poor for
only one or two generations; their children then rise. Not so for black
and brown families, without affirmative action and other forms of
help. The sons and daughters of middle-class professionals of color,
like myself, can fall precipitously from middle-class status, just like
that. So there is something different about poverty and color that
requires separate strategies. I admit that the problems overlap, but
they are separate problems and they may require separate strategies
and treatment.
AUDIENCE: If we accept the premise that American law is
inherently racist, what can be done about it? Where do we start?
And related to that, how can an inherently racist law be made
unracist, or are we just doomed to a perpetual battle to decrease the
level of racism in our laws?
PROFESSOR DELGADO: No. I don't think that it is a dispiriting
or an overly pessimistic view, if one accepts the position-as I do,
that American law is recurrently, inherently racist any more than, it
is enervating to accept the proposition that the human body, let's say,
is inherently frail. From which it follows then that one ought to take
reasonable measures. One ought to wear safety belts, one ought to
vaccinate children, and one does not simply give up from the
recognition that something is inherently a difficulty or a problem.
Vigilance is what is called for, not giving up. So no, I do not take
the position that the inherent racism that seems to inflict our society
requires any sort of surrender. Quite the contrary, it requires all of
our efforts if we are to be the society that we can be and that we are
in other respects. I will address this point later in my talk.
AUDIENCE: Why do I, a Latina-Chicana, make fifty-five cents out
of the white man's dollar?
PROFESSOR DELGADO: I am going to address that question not
1998]
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to you personally, but to you as an emblem of a larger group of
people, all Chicanas. You do so in part because of chauvinism,
because you are female. You, not individually but your class, do so
because of race and racism. It is convenient for the labor pool to
have people like you, me, and others of color, who are, from time to
time, unemployable. It is convenient for society, from time to time,
to have people like you and like my father-available to work at jobs
that other folks would not accept because they are dangerous, because
they are poorly paid, or because they are disagreeable. It is conve-
nient for society to have a labor pool like you and to demonize you
as an inferior group, as a convenient way of allowing blue-collar
whites, working-class whites, to feel superior to at least someone, and
thus deflect attention from those who are oppressing both groups. It
is the industrialists and the millionaires who really run things, and
who are making a dollar, if not a thousand dollars, per dollar that
everyone else makes. I will argue later in my presentation that it is
not accidental that you, not you personally, but your group and my
group, are in the condition that we are in. Thank you.
PROFESSOR FARBER'S CASE-IN-CHIEF
PROFESSOR FARBER: As I was getting ready to leave for the
airport, my wife gave me a final piece of advice about this debate.
She said, "Don't be too reasonable." Nevertheless, I would like to
begin by stressing some common ground that I think may get lost
because the debate format naturally encourages us to take adversarial
positions. In reality, Professor Delgado and I share a great deal in
our views of law and American society. Both of us see the issue of
racial inequality as being central and requiring the most serious
possible attention. Both of us reject the conservative dogma of color
blindness, and both of us, as I think will be shown tonight, believe
that one imperative need is for dialogue and discussion of this topic
if we are to make any progress. So we do have something in
common. But we also have a fundamental disagreement, I think, a
disagreement that is illustrated by the fact that we are on the opposite
sides of this debate about the inherent racism of American law. As
Professor Delgado said in his introductory remarks, critical race
theory's view is essentially that racism is embedded in the DNA of
American law. And that in effect, racism is not merely a widespread
blemish on American law, but is instead, a radical infection that goes
right to the heart of the legal system.
I disagree with that for reasons that I will hopefully make clear.
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I think that this thesis rests on a one-sided view of the legal system.
I think that it is based on a misunderstanding of some of the
fundamental principles of the system. I think in the end, despite what
I know are Professor Delgado's good intentions, that the inherent
racism position (and critical race theory, in general) risks being more
destructive than constructive in terms of advancing our national
conversation on race. I noticed that Professor Delgado postponed the
issue of inherent racism, or the inherency of racism, until his next ten
minutes. I may also put off, to some extent, my discussion of that
point as well, though I will refer to it briefly.
Let me begin with the vision of the American legal system that
Professor Delgado presented in his first twenty minutes. I do not
intend to deny the reality of the dark side of American law in
American legal history, and that dark side has indeed been very bad
at times. Nevertheless, I think one might equally point to some more
positive aspects of American legal society, and that we get only a
skewed and incomplete picture if we focus only on one side of the
picture: if we ignore the Thirteenth, 5 Fourteenth, 6 and Fifteenth 7
Amendments; if we ignore Brown v. Board of Education"8 and the
work of the Warren Court; if we ignore the Civil Rights Acts of
1964,' 9 1965,20 and 1990;2" and if we ignore or minimize the commit-
ment to affirmative action that many American institutions, especially
educational institutions, have had for the past two decades. I do not
think you have to be a triumphalist to think that these are important
developments-you only have to be a realist.
Similarly, as serious as the problem of racial inequality remains
in our society, it is also unrealistic to ignore the considerable amount
of progress that has been made. Consider the emergence of the black
middle class in the last generation or generation and a half, and the
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. U.S. CONST. amend XV.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2 1. Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, approved by the Senate on October 16, 1990, 136
CONG. REc. S15396 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) and the House on October 17, 1990, id. at
H9994-95 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990). However, President Bush vetoed the measure,
characterizing it as a "quota bill." See Statement on the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 26
WEEKLY COMP. PES. Doc. 1031 (Oct. 20, 1990).
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integration of important American institutions such as big-city police
forces, which are important in the day-to-day lives of many minority
people. The military has sometimes been described as the most
successfully integrated institution in American society. We all know,
as well, that the number of minority lawyers has risen substantially.
In state and federal legislatures, there was no such thing as a black
caucus in Congress thirty or forty years ago, because there would not
have been enough black people present to call a caucus. And do not
forget the considerable evidence of sharp changes in white attitudes
over that period in a more favorable and tolerant direction.
It is true that there is much in our history that we can only look
back on with a feeling of shame, but there is also much to be proud
of that we should not forget. I also think that the accusation that the
American legal system is inherently racist lacks perspective in the
sense that it seems to imply that there is something specifically
American about this problem. If you look around the world, societies
virtually everywhere are struggling with the problems of ethnic and
cultural pluralism, and are trying to find ways to incorporate diverse
groups into their governing structures. I think if you look around the
world, including even countries like France which Professor Delgado
referred to, it is far from clear that we are doing worse than the
others. In some ways, I think we are doing considerably better than
most.
You can always paint a picture of despair by only focusing on
the things that go wrong, and much of the critical race theory
literature that I have read along those lines reminds me a great deal
of the work that is being done by people at the opposite end of the
political spectrum. If you read Robert Bork's latest book "Slouching
Toward Gomorrah,"22 it reads exactly like Derrick Bell, 3 only in
reverse. While Bell sees an inherent flaw of racism that we can never
overcome and that will haunt us forever, Bork sees an inherent flaw
of egalitarianism that we can never overcome and that has corrupted
all aspects of our society. Both of them can point to some evidence.
If you only look at the evidence on one side of the thesis it begins to
look persuasive; but when you look at the evidence as a whole, I
think you see a much more complex picture.
22. See ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE (Regan Books 1996).
23. See DERRICK BELL, FACES OF THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM (Basic Books 1992).
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I think the inherency part of the thesis is perhaps the most
significant, so I want to say a few words about that now, although I
will probably need to come back to that after Professor Delgado's
next segment.
It seems to me the most powerful criticisms of our society or our
legal system are that it does not live up to its own ideals. For exam-
ple, how could Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of
Independence, also have been an owner of slaves? That puts the
question in stark terms. How can a legal system that prides itself on
equality still allow some of the outcomes that Professor Delgado has
detailed? I think those are powerful criticisms. But what I find most
disturbing about much of critical race theory is the argument that it
is not the performance that is the problem-it is the ideals. That it
is not that Jefferson did not live up to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, it is that the ideals of the Enlightenment, the ideals of the
Declaration of Independence themselves are inherently and "genetical-
ly" flawed, that are themselves inherently racist. That, as Professor
Delgado has said before, "normal legal discourse" is itself racist-or,
as Alex Johnson has said, that ordinary, supposedly neutral standards
of merit are secretly color coded for Whites only, or are presented in
a white voice.24
One of the primary tasks that we took on ourselves in the book
was to try to both document the academic support for that position
and then to try to explain why we considered it to be so fatally
flawed. It obviously resonates with a lot of postmodernist and post-
critical legal studies scholarship. There is a sort of trendiness to
talking about the social construction of reality. But when you put
aside all the philosophical jargon, it seems to be there just really is
not much to support the thesis, and I will return to that later.
Finally, and I think perhaps this is the most significant practical
problem, the inherent racism approach is not a step toward bringing
us to seriously confront the problems that our society has. In fact, I
think it is taking us down a false path. The dynamics of the concept
of inherent racism has several unfortunate effects. First of all, among
even its adherents, it leads to a kind of "witch hunt" mentality, in
which people are constantly searching for more and more subtle forms
of racism among themselves, among their opponents in the legal
system generally, and so forth. As a result, people invest their time
combing the Internal Revenue Code for deductions that might seem
24. See Alex Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 Yale L.J. 2007 (1991).
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more favorable to one group than another group, rather than looking
at what is the stark and overwhelming problem-not how people's
income is taxed but who is earning how much and why. So we
become more and more obsessed with looking for more and more
subtle flaws.
Furthermore, at least in the hands of some of the practitioners or
adherents to this position, it leads to a breakdown in debate, even
both among people who are essentially on the liberal side of the
spectrum and in disputes with their opponents. For example, consider
the attacks on liberals like Randy Kennedy, a black professor on the
Harvard Law School faculty. We see how people, who are in some
sense fundamentally allies, who all support affirmative action and
think racial problems are very important, find it impossible to hold a
discussion because of this search for motives, hidden agendas, and
biases. We see the same thing within critical legal studies in which
two figures in the movement, Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller,
bludgeoned each other in the pages of the Georgetown Law Journal
25
about their motivations and potential racism, etc. I do not think that
is the way we can move forward.
This thesis also has been destructive of dialogue with outsiders,
with the rest of American society, with people who are not already
believers in critical race theory or the inherent racism of American
society and law. For example, at my own law school, a young
member of our faculty, Jim Chen, wrote an article about racial inter-
marriage 6 that was considered to be inappropriate by some other
minority group members. An entire issue27 of the Iowa Law Review
was published, dedicated not only to criticizing his views, which I
think was entirely appropriate, but to speculations about the kinds of
twisted motives that could lead a member of a minority group to take
a position other than the approved critical race theory position. That
is not the way for us to move forward. We also see this in the
attacks, of which we heard a distant echo from Professor Delgado
earlier, on Daniel Moynihan, who has been a staunch liberal, strongly
concerned about minorities during his entire career, and yet has been
anathemized for making what were considered to be politically
25. See Colloquy, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251
(1992); Colloquy, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992);
Colloquy, Reply, 81 GEO. L.J. 343 (1992).
26. See Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145 (1994).
27. See Colloquy, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996).
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incorrect statements. I do not think this is going to lead us forward.
And finally, what I fear the most is the response that seemed to
be implied by one of the audience questions earlier. If it is true that
American society is inherently racist, doesn't that mean that it is
essentially hopeless? Now this conclusion does not logically follow
from that premise, any more than it logically follows that if certain
character traits have a genetic basis then it is hopeless to do anything
about them. But nevertheless, we all recognize that when we are
talking about individuals and biology, these genetic theories tend to
discourage the idea of reform, and tend to reinforce, as a matter of
social reality, the view that any bad behavior that we see is just
inherent. I think we can expect to see the same kind of thing when
we are dealing with the sociological equivalent involving the claim
that there is this inherent genetic flaw in American society. You can
see this most clearly in Derrick Bell's writings, which are redolent of
despair and which, in that respect, curiously resemble Robert Bork's
writings, who is similarly convinced that the genetic flaws of
American society will prevent it from ever achieving his vision of
justice.
It is true that we cannot afford to forget our history. It is true
that much of that history is unfortunate, if not worse. But it is also
true that if we remain totally obsessed with the flaws of the past,
fixated on their inevitability, we are unlikely to be able to move past
them and move forward. And in particular, it seems to me that if we
approach today's problems primarily as an issue in finger-pointing, in
blaming somebody or another, or in finding the culprit, then we are
not likely to be able to unite our society in a quest toward attacking
those serious problems.
AUDIENCE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
AUDIENCE: If American law is not inherently racist, how do you
explain the fact that African-Americans comprise fourteen percent of
the population but compose fifty-two percent of the prison popula-
tion?
PROFESSOR FARBER: First of all, I should say I am not, by any
means, an expert in criminal law. So I am prepared to be educated.
What I am giving you is my best understanding of what I think I
know right now. I think there are a couple things going on
there-some of them are flaws in the legal system and others are not.
One of my colleagues, Mike Tonry, is an expert in the criminal
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justice system and sociology. He has argued fairly persuasively that
the war on drugs, which began in the 1980's, has had a seriously
damaging effect on Blacks. Now I do not think that it is at all clear
that this was intended. In fact, it turns out that some important
congressional support for the war on drugs came from black members
of Congress. Nevertheless, in retrospect, it seems to me that if you
look at the disparate impact that the program has caused versus its
achievements, there is really serious doubt about whether the whole
thing has been well advised. I do not view that as being an indication
of an inherent flaw in the system. I do think that it is a possible
indication of a policy mistake-what may be a very serious policy
mistake. So that is part of .the problem that certainly has contributed
very substantially to the rapid growth in the racial discrepancy in the
prisons over the last fifteen or twenty years.
The other half of the equation is that by most measures, which
most criminologists accept, there is more crime in the inner cities than
there is elsewhere. Much of that crime is committed by Blacks
against Blacks. If you trace it back far enough, racism had something
to do with creating that situations. It is not clear to me, however, if
you could wave a magic wand and eliminate everything that Professor
Delgado thinks is a sign of racism in our legal system, that this
situation would go away. Sometimes, whatever the origin of a
problem was, once it exists, it takes on a life of its own. So I think
it is a somewhat complicated issue, and that the legal system has been
less than ideal in the way that it has responded to some crime
problems. But, I do not think that is the whole story.
AUDIENCE: Isn't the legal system being used today to undo the
progress you point to? Doesn't the legal system elevate white
expectancies over affirmative efforts towards racial equality? Aren't
recent court decisions, barring remedial efforts by government,
another example of this?
PROFESSOR FARBER: I would not try to paint the triumphalist
picture, in which things were terrible but now, in every day and every
way they are getting better and better. We have had periods of
success and periods of failure. Some new developments in the last
ten years go in what I think is the wrong direction. I think that is
unfortunate. But, I would not excuse these developments on the
grounds that they are nothing more than the expression of some inher-
ent flaw in the entire system. The people who made those mistakes
should not be allowed to claim that alibi. Instead, those mistakes
[Vol. 15:361
AMERICAN LAW
need to be confronted on their own terms and hopefully corrected.
AUDIENCE: Given evidence of widespread discrimination in
employment and housing, do you believe that discrimination by law
enforcement personnel is widespread? Isn't the way law enforcement
personnel sometimes act a sign of a racist legal system?
PROFESSOR FARBER: Do I think that there is some racism, or
even widespread racism, by law enforcement personnel? Well, I
would not be surprised. Do I think this would prove there is
something inherently flawed in the very heart of the system? No, I
think it shows that the system is not living up to its own aspirations.
I also think that we need to be careful of jumping to the conclusion
that bad outcomes are always due to discrimination. While it may be
true that law enforcement officials are biased, it is also true that the
percentages of people convicted of various kinds of crimes against
victims correspond fairly closely to the descriptions that you get from
the victims themselves in surveys by criminologists. There may be
bias-and the bias is bad-but the bias may not be the full explana-
tion of what is going on.
REBUTTALS AND CLOSING REMARKS
PROFESSOR DELGADO: You know it seems to me that the war on
drugs is part of the story, but only part of it. It all depends on what
you decide to criminalize. For example, if you criminalize ingestion
of crack cocaine much more harshly than that of the powdered kind,
then of course you are going to get a hugely disparate result out of
enforcement of the drug laws. If you decide that white-collar crime
is not really criminal and go easy on people who are guilty of
embezzlement or S&L fraud that bilks the public out of literally
billions of dollars, the same thing will happen. If you decide that
white-collar crime that takes the form of defense procurement fraud
or manufacturing of inherently dangerous products like DES or
Pintos-if you decide that these are not crimes, even though they
cause in the aggregate more loss of life, more pain, more injuries,
more deaths, or more lost dollars than all inner-city crimes or street
crime put together, then you will have a disparate impact, and you
may be willing to entertain the possibility that it is not just accidental.
Well, to this point, today's debate has proceeded along fairly
predictable lines. I have pointed out patterns of racism in American
legal history, while Professor Farber has emphasized times when that
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system has lent a helping hand. Please bear in mind, though, that a
legal system, like a defective car, may need an overhaul, even if it is
capable at other times of driving and serving perfectly well. A
system is inherently racist if two things are shown. First, that
discrimination is a recurring theme like a soundtrack in a movie or a
leitmotif in a musical composition, silent at times perhaps but always
there, always returning. This, I believe, I have shown. Second, that
the reason for its persistence is inherent in the culture. I did not say
biology of course, but culture. In that respect, consider three things.
One. Consider how racism takes different forms at different
times, like one of those characters in a science fiction novel or movie.
In one era, it is blatant, open, and in your face. In another, it is
subtle, institutional, embedded in seemingly neutral rules like a
University of Colorado at Boulder requirement that all first-year
students live in a campus-residence hall: that is a neutral rule.
However, many students of color from Denver, thirty-five miles away,
would prefer to live at home and commute saving the money,
avoiding some of the "Animal House" features of dorm life that go
against Latino culture, and looking after their younger brothers or
sisters who may be flirting with drugs or gangs. In another era,
racism takes the form of gentlemanly learned tracts with hundreds of
footnotes debating whether folks of color are genetically inferior. The
players, the arguments, and the rationalizations may vary over time,
but the gap in brown/white earnings, life expectancy, and social well
being remains about the same as though, obeying some unseen law.
Two. Notice how when courts and other official policy makers
relax, or even decide to help minorities, this happens more to advance
white self-interest than to help the supposed beneficiaries. For
example, Brown v. Board of Education, the case that Professor Farber
held up as the crown jewel of American jurisprudence, decided in
1954, came down just as many U.S. servicemen and women of color
were returning to civilian life from military service, where many of
them for the first time had experienced a relatively racism free
environment. Many of them probably would not have returned
meekly to shining shoes and regimes of "Yes sir" and "No sir." For
the first time in a while, the possibility of real racial unrest loomed
in the United States. At the same time, we were in the early stages
of a cold war against the forces of godless, ruthless communism. It
scarcely would have served U.S. purposes well had the front pages of
world newspapers continued to show pictures of Emmett Till
lynchings and southern sheriffs with cattle prods. Brown and other
breakthrough cases occur not so much out of generosity or moral
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imperative, but out of a need to advance white self-interest. Later,
when the celebrations died down, the great law reform case was
inevitably cut back quietly by lower courts or impeded by administra-
tive foot-dragging or delay. Today, more black school children attend
segregated schools than when Brown v. Board of Education was
decided.
Finally, consider how improvements for one minority group are
often accompanied by worsening treatment of another. When Brown
v. Board of Education struck down school segregation, eliciting great
and deserved rejoicing, the United States government was ordering
"Operation Wetback," a massive deportation program for Mexican-
looking people. Only two years later, an article28 appeared in Duke
Law School's Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems approving
the whole thing and urging more of the same. Reconstruction, which
saw great gains for African-Americans, saw the enactment of
viciously anti-Asian immigration laws, in part as a sop to white
southerners concerned that caste might turn out to mean little after all.
Korematsu v. United States,29 which upheld Japanese internment, was
decided only ten years before Brown v. Board of Education. During
World War II, we were a little nicer to Blacks, Mexicans and Indians,
needing them on the front and in war plants, but turned our backs on
Jews fleeing the holocaust. And, finally, recall how Justice Harlan,
author of that ringing dissent in Plessy,3 ° joined in a virulently anti-
Asian opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case only a short time later.
Well, I don't know about you, but for me a pattern begins to
emerge-like a figure in a photograph in a darkroom tub. Four
centuries, four racial groups, three mechanisms. Does that pattern
warrant the conclusion that something inheres in American culture
that renders people of color recurrently one down? I am afraid so.
PROFESSOR FARBER: I thought I would begin by saying a little
more about the criminal justice system since that came up. I think the
discussion illustrates some of the problems that we fall into in this
kind of debate. One would think from much of the literature, at least
in law reviews, that stringent law enforcement against drugs and street
crimes is a majority culture imposition. One might also get the
28. See Eleanor M. Hadley, A Critical Analysis of the Wetback Problem, 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (1956) (approving of "operation wetback").
29. 323 U.S. 214 (1945).
30. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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impression that if members of minority groups had their way, those
police would be pulled off the streets and instead would be patrolling
the halls of Microsoft and General Motors looking for antitrust
violations or consumer frauds. The reality is quite different. There
was a Gallop Poll, for example, in 1993 that reported the following
about public opinions among Blacks: eighty-two percent thought the
courts in their area did not treat criminals harshly enough, seventy-
five percent of Blacks favored putting more police on the streets to
combat crime, and sixty-eight percent favored building more prisons
so that longer sentences could be given.3'
The crack cocaine law, which I think Professor Delgado and I
both disapprove of, originated in the House Committee on Narcotic
Abuse and Control, which was chaired by a black congressman from
Harlem. So, even when a racial impact may seem problematic to
some of us, it does not necessarily follow that it should be interpreted
as simply one group dominating another. This has also been true
historically in America with immigration, in which immigration
restrictions have been favored both by xenophobic natives and also by
recent immigrants and their descendants, who are disturbed by the
disruption and competition from further immigration. And that has
been true both today and as far back as the early 1900's, when unions
fought for restrictions on immigration to protect American workers.
The dynamics of these things are just a lot more complicated than the
simple reference to racism makes it appear.
Indeed, the whole idea of racism begins to lose any kind of core
meaning when we get to the point of saying that a rule about dorm
residence is racist because it is opposed by some minority students.
It may be a bad rule. (I know when I was an undergraduate I thought
it was terrible to require students to live in the dorm, but not for
exactly the same reasons.) One of the problems with the rule might
be that it has particularly ill effects for minorities. But it seems to me
that when we get to the point of pointing the finger of racism in that
kind of situation, we have debased our vocabulary. What vocabulary
do we have left with which to talk about Rodney King, when we have
used up the word racism to talk about a dorm residence rule? I just
do not think that this kind of finger-pointing is constructive. I doubt
if it advanced deliberations over the dorm rule in Colorado to have
charges of racism being made, as opposed to a discussion of the




merits of the situation. Again, I do not impugn the motives that have
led Professor Delgado and others to make these charges. I think in
many ways it is entirely understandable. But nevertheless, I think it
is just taking us farther away from solving our problems.
PROFESSOR DELGADO: Well, the image of finger-pointing and
shaking one's finger and looking for things that are not there is a
powerful one. No one wants to be accused of fabricating or of whip-
ping up hysteria over something that does not exist or is well on its
way out. But it seems to me that an equally powerful image is that
of the willfully blindfolded individual, refusing to see what is there,
the Panglossian individual who takes the position that we live in the
best of all possible worlds; that things are getting better and better;
that few measures, little vigilance, and little effort are required. It
seems to me that in a society with a history like ours, if one is to
make an error, it needs to be on the side of over-vigilance rather than
the other.
I am reminded of a television program, Larry King Live, which
I saw just before setting out on the trip here. I think it was on
Friday, when the son of George Wallace appeared. I believe it was
Wallace's eightieth birthday, or something of this sort; I missed the
first few minutes of the program. But the son, an overwhelmingly
charming, intelligent, seemingly well-educated, forty- or fifty-year-old
fellow, in response to the question as to whether his father had been
a force for evil in the South-a force for racism-before his accident
and religious conversion, blandly insisted that the opposite was the
case. I do not think it is because Junior was racist or would ever
have ordered federal marshals out or spoken the inflammatory words
that his father did during the months and years right after Brown v.
Board of Education; rather, I think it is for two reasons. One,
because you can always find another explanation, you can always find
another reason why things are the way they are. And the young
fellow on the program did that in elaborate and almost persuasive
fashion. When his father did this thing or that thing during his
regime, it was not because he disliked black people or wanted to
resist desegregation. It was rather because he was trying to preserve
Southern culture. He was seeking to protect an important point
having to do with political autonomy. He was trying to keep peace
and order. He was trying to send carpetbaggers and outside agitators
home. He was doing anything other than trying to set back the cause
of African-American advances and liberation.
1998]
THOMAS M COOLEYLAW REVIEW
Now.it seems to me that one can always do that. And it seems
to me that it is doubly tempting to take that position as Professor
Farber has, to some extent, done today, if one is doing it in connec-
tion with an institution or a region or a country or a person that one
genuinely loves. The young man on the television program genuinely
loved his father. It was easy to see that. And indeed, after his acci-
dent and change of heart, even Jesse Jackson, who was also on the
program, loved the man and forgave him.
Now all of us love our society on one level or the other and we
are loath to apply hard terms like "racist" or "inherently racist" to it.
But sometimes, as with children and parents, the course of true
solicitude for an institution calls for pointing out its defects, facing up
to them squarely, and trying to do something about them. That is all
I have been arguing here today. That is all critical race theory stands
for, and I believe that, as a society and as a legal institution, we will
be the better off for the collective self-examination that I have urged
and that many in American society are going through today. Thank
you.
GENERAL AUDIENCE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
AUDIENCE: I recently read an article about the hiring practices of
the United States Supreme Court, where Whites, more importantly
white males, were the ones getting the clerk jobs, while very few
minorities are hired. How can the Court justify these actions when
they themselves are supposed to uphold racial justice laws?
PROFESSOR DELGADO: Professor Farber was a clerk for the
United States Supreme Court-he might want to comment and then
I could say a few words when he is finished. Where there any
minority clerks in your year?
PROFESSOR FARBER: No, there weren't. I do not know how
deeply committed I am to defending the hiring decisions of the
current Justices. They never ask my advice about whom to hire, so
I do not feel deeply involved with that. I think that there are a
number of mechanisms that are operating here. In fact, I think some
of them raise some really interesting issues the critical race theorists
have sought to address. In the case of some of the Justices, I think
it is conceivable that personal bias has played a role, but I think it is
very unlikely for any of the Justices who have been on the Court in
recent years. However, I think there are some other factors that we
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can point to. One is the kinds of criteria that have been used to hire
clerks. I think some of these are good indicators related to merit
while others seem to be worthless. The typical Supreme Court clerk
is somebody who was an officer on the Harvard or Yale law reviews,
got extremely good grades in law school, and clerked for a high-
power United States Court of Appeals judge. The percentage of
minorities who have those credentials is disproportionately low. So,
I think that, at least historically, this is a good part of the explanation.
Now, to what extent should we try to defend those standards? It
seems to me that that is a significant question. The fact that they lead
to disproportionate outcomes does not seem to be enough in itself to
condemn them. But, I think that the Justices ought to be prepared to
think about whether in fact those standards measure something that is
relevant to the job of being a United States Supreme Court clerk. At
least to some extent, they clearly do. For example, the work done on
law reviews, in terms of research and writing, has a significant resem-
blance to the kinds of roles that law clerks play in writing opinions.
Clerking for a court of appeals judge is a very relevant practical
experience. So, if this were a Title VII case and we were asking
whether those credentials could be justified despite their disparate
impact, I think the answer might very well be "yes." One of the
things that I find constructive about critical race theory is that it leads
us to ask those questions. Some of the criticisms that Professor
Delgado has made of standards of merit can lead us to look at those
standards with a fresh eye and ask: "Are they really serving their
purposes? Do they really benefit society?" I guess what I find
disturbing about this critique is the assumption that the answer must
be "no," that if there is a disproportionate impact then the problem
must lie with the standard and that if we only had the right standards
then problems would disappear.
PROFESSOR DELGADO: I think that that record on the part of the
United States Supreme Court is absolutely indefensible. What's more,
it is not even in their self-interest to maintain the pattern that they do
in the hiring of all white clerks. Let me give you a couple of
examples. At the University of Colorado Law School where I teach,
and this is true in many schools around the nation where I travel and
speak, the students of color, admitted with entering LSATs and grade
point averages considerably lower, in most cases, than those of the
others, after graduation do as well as those others and in some cases
better. Our bar passage rate for students of color is in the eighty plus
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percentile. For all students, it is in that -range as well. But then after
graduation, the record compiled by our students of color is even sligh-
tly better than those other extremely talented classmates who are
white. The percentage who go on to prestigious jobs like clerkships,
law teaching, and commissionerships in state or federal governments
is slightly higher. A recent book by Derek Bok 32 followed tens of
thousands of affirmative action admittees in the United States to see
how they are faring after graduation. The answer is that they are
doing just fine. So I would argue that for the Supreme Court to take
a monochromatic class of Supreme Court clerks year after year after
year today is indefensible with all of that talent that is out there as
evidenced by post-graduation accomplishment statistics, partnerships
earned, prizes won, law review articles written, and other standard
measures of academic and legal merit.
Indeed, I would argue that if the Supreme Court had a greater
variety of clerks, by including more women and members of color, it
would issue better opinions. I will just mention one case-the
Kulko33 case that you take up in civil procedure. In that case, the
Supreme Court denied personal jurisdiction to a California divorcee
whose husband, living in New York, simply unloaded two children on
her by sending them to California. Under the California Long-Arm
Statute, the California courts held that she should have jurisdiction
based on the adequacy of those contacts. At stake was whether she
would be able to maintain her action for a modification of the child
support arrangements in California or would have to travel all the way
to New York to get jurisdiction over her ex-husband. In a fairly
ruthless opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that she would
not have jurisdiction, 34 in part, because the husband was not intention-
ally availing himself of the forum of California. I would maintain
that had the Supreme Court at that time had a sihgle woman Jus-
tice-especially a divorced one-their analysis would not have been
so cursory and they would have at least found it a more difficult case.
And so with dozens of cases that come before it, raising issues of
social equity for African-Americans, people of color, the poor,
workers, and women, if the Court loosened up a little bit, it would be
dispensing a better class of jurisprudence. I think that hiring a more
diverse body of clerks is a good place to start.
32. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 1.
33. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
34. See id at 101.
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AUDIENCE: From the point of view of critical race theory, what are
the best strategies for improving our society? What kinds of specific
things should be done? I gathered from the most recent comments
that perhaps changing the composition of the Court, in terms of its
law clerks, would at least make some contribution in your perspective.
Does critical race theory embrace the idea that disparate impact alone
should be enough to raise discrimination issues? And would that be
a good strategy or are there other specific strategies that you would
recommend?
PROFESSOR FARBER: It is important to distinguish between
disparate impact and intent. But my own view of the anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, and probably to some extent that of constitutional law,
is that intent should not be the only factor. There are situations in
which a severe, unjustified disparate impact ought to be enough to get
the courts to intervene. There are also some cases where the disparate
impact is so strong that I think it does lead to an inference about
intent. But sometimes even when the disparate impact is due to
inattention or other benign causes, nevertheless, something should be
done about it. So I am not one to defend, all the way down the line,
the Supreme Court's current view of the role of intent.
PROFESSOR DELGADO: On the question of whether critical race
theory has any sort of agenda, set of action points, or guide points for
the future, it seems to me that the criticism that the movement has
spent too much of its energy on pointing out flaws in liberalism may
actually be true. If you go up to the average Crit and say:
Suppose I agreed with all your critical assessment and suppose we
were able magically to fix all of that. You, Crit, advocate doing away
with the intent requirement. You, Crit, advocate strengthening
affirmative action. You, Crit, advocate this, that, and the other.
Suppose all of that were accomplished-all of the bad social structures
that you were attacking fell by the wayside, then what would you want
to do next? What would be your action program?
And the movement has just begun considering what those steps would
be. I think that one theme, that as a sort of chronicler of the
movement, I find emerging in critical race theory literature, which is
a wholly desirable one, is a focus on the way the law is actually
practiced and what people are beginning to call "critical clinical legal
education." It is an emerging body of critical theory that examines
the way lawyers and their clients interact that asks difficult theoretical
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questions about such things as: How does a lawyer construct a cli-
ent's story? How does a lawyer understand who the client is? How
and when does the client need to serve as a stand-in for a larger
community, so that the things that one does in helping get this client
off do not stigmatize and damage the entire community of which he
or she might be a part-say the Vietnamese community. It seems to
me that these are issues that are about to be on the front burner of
critical theory and have a direct bearing on how we lawyers practice
law and how we in law schools teach it.
PROFESSOR FARBER: Well, I guess I applaud the statement that
critical race theorists spend too much of their energy on attacks on
liberalism. Especially since many liberals consider themselves to be
an endangered species in today's political world anyway. In his
closing remarks, Professor Delgado diplomatically suggested that I
was sort of Panglossian-convinced that this is the best of all possible
worlds and so on. I think it is probably true that those of us who
love our society, or who love the law, have a tendency to look for the
good parts. But there is also a sense in which I think critical race
theory itself is too Panglossian. The message of critical race theory
seems to be that if only disparate impact was adopted, etc., etc.; if
only lawyers were doing the right thing in their community; if only
Whites got their act together and stopped being racists-then
everything would be fine. In some ways, I think that is a fairly
optimistic vision. The reality is that-however our current problems
got going, and however much the law may be failing to address
them-those problems would not go away simply by making changes
in the legal system or in what lawyers do. In one sense, critical race
theory is making things too easy, and too hard in another, by
pretending they would.
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